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Abstract 
Anonymous application procedures (AAP) are increasingly promoted as a way 
to combat employment discrimination. The idea gets support from theory and 
experimental evidence, but virtually nothing is known about its real-life effects. 
We present empirical evidence building on micro data collected in the Swedish 
city of Gothenburg, where AAP was used in parts of the local administration. 
Difference-in-differences estimates, with extensive controls for qualifications, 
suggest that AAP increased the chances of advancing to interviews for both 
women and individuals of non-Western origin. Women also experienced a 
higher probability of being offered a job, but no such effect is found for 
immigrants.  
Keywords: Anonymous applications, discrimination, employment 
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Throughout the industrialized world, women continue to earn less than men 
and ethnic minorities often exhibit drastically lower employment rates than the 
native populations. Politicians and researchers in many countries today turn 
their eyes to ethnic and gender discrimination in the hiring process as a cause 
of these disparities. This has led to calls for using anonymous application 
procedures (AAP) where, e.g., the name, gender and country of origin of the 
applicant is hidden from the recruiter in the initial stages of the hiring process. 
Yet, very little is known about the practical consequences of this way of 
combating discrimination. We present empirical evidence from a Swedish pilot 
using the method on a substantial number of actual job openings. 
Recent experimental studies appear to have raised the interest in employ-
ment discrimination among both scholars and politicians. Although not a new 
phenomenon (see Riach & Rich 2002 for a survey), the convincing dis-
crimination testing performed by Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004) sparked the 
debate in many countries. This is certainly the case in Sweden, where the 
obstacles facing large parts of the immigrant population have become one of 
the top issues on the political agenda. Indeed, “residual” economic evidence on 
ethnic discrimination has been around for some time (le Grand & Szulkin 2002, 
Arai & Vilhelmsson 2004, Rooth 2002). Studies have also revealed dis-
crimination through laboratory experiments, indicating the influence of 
“foreign” and “native” names in different types of settings (Holm 2000, Ahmed 
2005). A recent field experiment also resulted in conclusions very similar to 
what has been found in the US: an application carrying a “Middle Eastern” 
name gives substantially worse payoff in terms of the callback rate than an 
application carrying a Swedish name (Carlsson & Rooth 2007).
1,2  
There is also direct scientific evidence that “blindfolding” the employer can 
affect the hiring process. The most well-known example is Goldin & Rouse 
(2000), who found that female musicians have a higher probability of getting 
                                                      
1 See also Eriksson (2007) for a general overview of studies on immigrants in the Swedish labor 
market. 
2 In addition, new evidence from psychological tests (Rooth, 2007) suggest that recruiting 
managers (and others) may suffer from negative “implicit attitudes” towards people with foreign-
sounding names. This means that people unknowingly to themselves may have negative attitudes 
towards applicants from certain groups, perhaps providing some additional justification for AAP 
as a viable policy.  
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Swedish online job searcher databases where applicants can choose whether to 
reveal names and other personal characteristics, and find that selection on 
gender information reduces the chances of getting contacted by an employer by 
15 percent for women. Eriksson & Lagerström (2007) estimates that a “non-
Nordic” name in a Swedish online CV gives 25 percent fewer contacts from 
employers. 
There is thus striking evidence that gender and ethnicity matters in the 
hiring process even though this is considered discrimination by current 
legislation. What is not known, however, (at least not outside auditions for 
symphonic orchestras) is whether a hiring practice based on AAP is an 
effective, let alone efficient, way of combating such discrimination. The data 
we use come from the city of Gothenburg, where two districts forming parts of 
the local government administration implemented AAP to sort out applicants to 
interviews during 2004–2006. We have collected information on 3,529 
applicants to a total of 109 positions from two participating districts and from 
one comparison district. The data contain unusually detailed information on the 
applicants’ education and labor market experience matched to the requirements 
given in the ads for the respective jobs. We are able to follow the hiring process 
through its different stages: who applies for the job in question, who is 
considered qualified by the employer, who is interviewed, and who is offered 
the job. 
For job openings where AAP was used, we find that gender and region-of-
origin do not affect the probability of being offered an interview. As would be 
expected from previous research, these factors do matter for the comparison 
jobs using “normal” procedures. Consequently, AAP is estimated to increase 
the probability of being interviewed for both non-Western immigrants and 
women. 
In contrast to many of the discrimination studies listed above,
3 we are also 
able to study how AAP affects the job offer arrival rates of different groups. 
For women we find that the AAP regime significantly increases the chances of 
receiving a job offer, but no such effect is found in the region-of-origin 
dimension, suggesting that the interview stage may wash away the positive 
effects in the first stage of the hiring process for this group. 
                                                      
3 Exceptions are “audit studies” (also called ”situation tests”) where actors are sent to interview 
sessions (see Riach and Rich 2002) as well as Goldin and Rouse (2000). 
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background and institutional detail. Section 3 describes the data collection and 
presents some characteristics on the relevant job openings and applicants. 
Section 4 outlines the empirical approach and section 5 presents the results. 
Section 6 gives some concluding remarks.  
2  Some general background 
This section presents background and general facts regarding the AAP policy 
pilot studied in this paper.
4 First, however, we give a very brief Swedish 
institutional background. Swedish law prohibits discrimination on gender, 
religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation or disabilities. Preferential treatment of 
underrepresented applicants (“affirmative action”) is allowed with respect to 
gender (when credentials are equal), but not with respect to ethnicity. Since the 
job openings we are to study are all in the public sector it is important to note 
that the process of filling a vacancy in the public sector in Sweden does not 
differ much from the corresponding private sector process. The main 
differences is an obligation to publish vacancies and a stricter compliance with 
the law stating that all vacancies (private and public) are to be posted at the 
Public Employment Service (PES). 
The policy pilot took place within the administration of the city of 
Gothenburg, Sweden’s second largest city. The Gothenburg municipality has a 
population of approximately 500,000, and the total metropolitan area is home 
to about 900,000 people. The ethnic variation in Gothenburg, as in Sweden in 
general, is to a large degree generated by immigration in the last three decades. 
Employment rates for immigrants are far below those for natives, particularly 
for groups originating outside Europe. In greater Gothenburg, 15 percent of the 
population is foreign-born which is above the national average of 13 percent, 
but somewhat lower than the immigrant shares of Stockholm and Malmö, the 
other two major cities of Sweden.  
The municipal administration in Gothenburg is divided into 21 city districts 
and about 20 specialized offices. Typically, each district or office has a small 
personnel department which deals with the general administration of personnel 
issues. Importantly for our study, the personnel offices may affect the 
                                                      
4 The presentation primarily draws on the implementation study by Sibbmark (2007). 
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they are not involved in the actual choices of who to interview or hire. This 
latter part is decentralized to the responsible managers of each production unit.  
In February 2004 the Gothenburg city council decided that AAP was to be 
implemented as a policy pilot. After an extension in October 2005 the pilot 
came to run from October 1, 2004 to June 30, 2006. The primary reason for 
implementing the pilot was to enhance the hiring probability of immigrants into 
municipal jobs. We study data from job openings within “Centrum” and 
“Kortedala”, the two city districts that were chosen for the pilot. We also use 
data on job openings from the “Gunnared” district which continued with 
normal recruitment practices and therefore generated the comparison jobs used 
in our analysis. 
The participating districts were not chosen randomly. All parts of the city 
administration were asked whether they wanted to participate and the actual 
participants were selected among seven districts and specialized offices which 
expressed an interest for participation. The stated reasons for the choice were 
that the districts were of different sizes and had expressed strong interest in the 
pilot.
5 Gunnared was chosen as the comparison district since its personnel 
department was willing to help with the pilot. They were skeptical towards the 
AAP method since they considered it a hinder in their active work towards 
ethnic diversity among the districts’ personnel. Thus, personnel administration 
officers in both the AAP districts and the comparison district appear to value 
the work towards ethnic diversity. 
It is quite clear that our data are not generated by a randomized experiment, 
which suggests that we should worry about selection effects. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the location and resident population differ between the districts:
6 The 
Centrum (AAP) district is located in the city center, with a population of 
54,000. Kortedala (AAP) and Gunnared (comparison) are located quite close to 
each other in the north east, with populations of 27,000 and 22,000 
respectively. As is typical for European cities, the city center is socially 
advantaged: welfare dependence
7 and unemployment both stood at 3 percent in 
2006. The fraction foreign-born—which is often considered a good indicator of 
                                                      
5 The “culture” office was also selected to participate but the office had very few job openings 
and failed to document them properly.  
6 The statistics come from the Gothenburg city administration and pertain to 2006. 
7 By welfare dependence we here mean social assistance, which is the means-tested ”last resort” 
of the Swedish social security system. See Åslund & Fredriksson (2005) for further details. 
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comparison district of Gunnared is the most socially disadvantaged. Unem-
ployment is 5.6 percent, 23 percent of the population live in a welfare-receiving 
household, and 48 percent are foreign-born. Kortedala falls somewhere in 
between with an unemployment (welfare dependence) rate of 4 (9) percent, and 
a fraction foreign-born of 28 percent. 
The three city districts have the same responsibilities: child care, schools, 
health services and care for the elderly, social services etc. Statistics from the 
city council also suggest that the stocks of employees are quite similar in many 
ways. The number of full-year workers is between 1,500 and 1,850, and 
approximately 85 percent of the employees are women. Given the differences 
in the resident population it is not unexpected that Gunnared has a larger 
fraction foreign-born among the employees. Turnover is 5 percent in Kortedala 
and Gunnared, somewhat higher (6.6 percent) in Centrum. Sick leave rates are 
between 11 and 12.6 percent in the different administrations, and the age 
distribution of the employees is also quite similar.  
There are thus similarities as well as differences between the AAP districts 
and the comparison district. The question is then whether we can expect the 
data from job openings in Gunnared to serve as a description of what would 
have happened at job openings at Centrum and Kortedala, had they not used 
AAP? The main threats to identifying the effects of the AAP are if the 
applicants of different groups (men/women, Swedish/non-Swedish origin) vary 
in unobserved credentials between the jobs in the different regimes, and/or if 
the managers in the different districts differ in their behavior relative to the 
applicants. 
There are three reasons as to why we consider the comparison to be 
accurate. First, our judgment is that the districts act in the same local labor 
market and thus roughly attend to the same group of job seekers. The main 
reason is geographical. It is noteworthy that Statistics Sweden considers the 
whole of greater Gothenburg as a common local labour market and these 
districts are far from the borders of this area. Centrum can be reached by public 
transport within less than half an hour from both Gunnared and Kortedala. The 
same is true for the two latter districts, which are located quite close to each 
other; a map search suggests a car (or bike) trip of less than 8 kilometers. For 
those registered at the PES in Gothenburg, an instruction to apply for a relevant 
job opening is as likely to arrive regardless of which district it is in. It therefore 
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even for potential applicants who are hesitant towards long commutes.  
Second, it is important to note that the selection into the AAP pilot was 
based on decisions made by the personnel offices at each district council. Thus, 
the actual recruiting managers who in general are further down in the local 
hierarchy, serving as e.g. managers at day care centers, did not have a direct 
say in the decision to participate. Available evidence does not suggest that 
AAP managers have a more positive view of AAP than comparison managers. 
Although Sibbmark (2007) surveyed the managers in all three districts after the 
AAP pilot, it is interesting to note that approximately the same fraction (one 
third of the recruiting managers) in both the AAP and comparison samples 
stated that they expected the AAP-model to increase the chances for im-
migrants to be interviewed and hired. Furthermore, managers in the comparison 
data expressed a more positive view of AAP than managers in the AAP 
districts.
8  
The third argument concerns “applicant selection effects” as a result of the 
AAP scheme; i.e. if people choose to apply for positions at administrations 
using their preferred hiring method. This would mean that we estimate the joint 
effect of AAP on who applies for the job and on how the recruiting managers 
change their behavior as a result of AAP; a problem intrinsic to all “partial” 
policies, i.e. as long as the entire economy does not switch to AAP applicants 
may sort themselves between jobs. We address this issue by including very 
detailed information about the applicants’ credentials relative to the job 
opening in our models (see Section 3 below for details) and in Section 4 we 
also present some tests of the identifying assumption.
9  
                                                      
8 The responses of participating (and comparison) managers suggested that 24 percent (32 
percent) had a positive view and 60 percent (20 percent) a negative view of AAP. 
9 In section 4 we discuss some attempts to test the identifying assumption. We are however 
unable to study selection on unobserved characteristics.
 Goldin & Rouse (2000) report that less 
“skilled” (in terms of fixed effects) women applied for orchestra positions when “blind” 
orchestra auditions were used. If this result would hold for our (admittedly very different) setting 
it would mean that our results would be downward biased, i.e. we would underestimate the 
effects of AAP.  
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3.1  AAP implementation and data collection 
In Gothenburg, the AAP aimed at preventing recruiting managers from seeing 
the full content of applications when deciding on whom to interview. The 
procedure was therefore designed so as to block information revealing gender 
or ethnicity (with the latter factor being the primary reason for initiating the 
scheme). Naturally, gender and ethnicity is typically revealed during the 
interviews, so all information was disclosed to the recruiting managers once the 
interviewees were selected. 
The job ads stated if a position was subject to the AAP and, if so, applicants 
were informed that they needed to fill in an “anonymous application form” 
asking for relevant credentials (see below).
10  This form was to be submitted 
alongside the conventional application. Once the applications and forms arrived 
to the districts the forms were screened for identifying information, numbered 
to match with the rest of the applications, and separated from the applications 
by the personnel staff.
11 The anonymous application forms were then sent to 
the recruiting managers who were to base their interview selection solely on 
this information.  
The anonymous application form requested that the applicant provided 
information on education, labor market experience, current employment, and 
(optional) additional relevant information. The applicants were specifically 
instructed not to reveal “identifying” information revealing gender or ethnicity. 
Note that it was explicitly stated that this included information regarding which 
school/university one had attended, since such information would reveal the 
ethnicity of many immigrant applicants.  
Once the interviewees were chosen by the managers, the central admin-
istration provided the managers with the second (i.e. “normal”) part of the 
                                                      
10 During the initial stages of the trials, the participating administrations were given basically full 
freedom in exactly how to implement the procedure. After some time it was clear that e.g. 
methods based on having an employee manually converting standard applications to anonymous 
ones was much too inefficient. The participating administrations then decided to follow the more 
formalized and uniform procedure described here. The robustness checks presented in section 5 
include some variations pertaining to the implementation of the AAP. 
11 Public administrations are obliged to register and maintain all incoming documents; so this 
was not a major change from normal procedures. 
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personal data and typically also a “standard” CV. 
3.1.1  Data collection and preparation 
We collected data covering the entire recruitment process. This included ads, 
information given by managers (on written forms prepared by us and 
distributed by the personnel offices in the three districts), and all components 
of the individual applications from the districts. We then matched the 
individual information to the criteria given in the job ads and converted the 
printed material into a database. Below we describe the details on how the 
material was collected and organized.  
Recruiting managers were asked to evaluate the candidates by grading them 
on a scale A to D before (or during) the selection of interviewees: the grades 
were A – “will be offered an interview”; B – “no interview offer in the first 
round but possibly later”; C – “formally qualified but of no interest”; D – “not 
qualified”. The managers were also asked to state whether he/she was able to 
identify who the applicant was.  
During the interview stage, the managers were asked to indicate whether the 
applicant was (i) offered the job and (ii) hired.
12 They were also asked if the 
applicant was already employed by Gothenburg city. The recruiting managers 
responsible for the comparison jobs were asked for the corresponding 
information. 
When coding the information from the applications, we aimed to document 
everything open to the eyes of the recruiting manager at different steps of the 
process. We therefore separately documented merits as they appeared in the 
anonymous application forms and later in the full CV. We also documented 
various peculiarities in the printed material, e.g. margin comments by the 
manager, poor language or an odd application, or information revealing gender 
or ethnicity. In order to document each candidate’s merits in a way which was 
meaningful to the recruiting manager we strived to base our coding on how 
well the qualifications met the requirements stated in the job ad. The data 
therefore contain unusually rich information on how strong the applicants’ 
merits are for the specific position in question (see 3.4 for a description of the 
exact variables).  
                                                      
12 The form also asked for a ranking of the interviewees, information which we do not use below. 
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whether the applicant possesses the type of education requested. We tried to 
follow the spirit of the job ads in doing this. Thus, if a job ad asks for e.g. a 
“pre-school teacher”, it suffices to have completed any such education for this 
criterion to be met. But if the ad asks for “pre-school teachers specialized in 
Montessori learning”, it is not enough to have a general pre-school teacher 
education. Similar criteria were used for experience, where we separated 
experience in the occupation one applied for from “other relevant experience”. 
There is admittedly some arbitrariness in what constitutes the latter. Our basic 
rule was that the experience must be directly relevant for the job, either through 
the requirements given in the ad, or for other obvious reasons. If you e.g. apply 
for a headmaster position, it is obviously relevant to have worked as a teacher, 
and if the ad asks for leadership skills, any management experience is counted 
as relevant. Although this procedure by nature will have an arbitrary 
component, it was simplified by the fact that the city districts’ responsibilities 
limit the variation in job types included in our data. Also, the empirical model 
we use accounts for any systematic differences between occupations. 
Our first key variable is region of origin, which in the Swedish context is a 
fair approximation of ethnicity. We split information on origin into three broad 
categories: Sweden (reference), (other) Western countries, the non-Western; as 
well as a residual “unknown” category. We tried to let people define their own 
region of origin as much as possible. If somebody writes “my mother tongue is 
X”, or “my nationality is X”, we let X define the origin, otherwise we use place 
of birth. Typically, the information is found in the application letter, but some 
also include it in their CV, and in a few cases people do not disclose their 
region of origin at all.
 13
Our second key variable is gender which we code using information on 
name or information from the personal identification number which most 
applicants include in their application. The group with “gender unknown” 
consists of applications where first names are either missing or are judged most 
likely not to be known to the recruiter (i.e. unusual foreign names) and where 
there is no other information identifying gender.  
                                                      
13 Applications can be classified as “origin unknown” for several reasons, the most common 
being that the application was incomplete to begin with or that we were unable to get hold of the 
full application. In 65 cases where there was no direct origin information, but where the name 
gave a suggestion that “non-Western” was the appropriate region of origin, we assigned the 
observation to this category. See Section 5.3 for robustness checks. 
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baseline analysis, but pay little attention to them due to the interpretational 
difficulties. The sensitivity analyses include varying the rules for group 
assignment and imposing restrictions on the estimation sample; we will return 
to this in section 5. 
In addition to these variables we coded a “poor language” variable taking 
the value one if there are relatively strong deficiencies in the writing. These 
errors are more common among—although not limited to—applicants of non-
Swedish origin. We also documented if the applicant included a photograph, 
whether he or she was already employed somewhere in the Gothenburg 
administration, or if he or she was listed as having a rehire “priority” due to a 
redundancy at a previous employment within the Gothenburg administration. 
As is likely to happen in real-world hirings, not everybody adhered strictly 
to the instructions. Some applicants provided only non-anonymous applications 
for jobs that were advertised as being AAP jobs. The city districts’ personnel 
officers had to deal with these cases somehow before sending the AAP forms 
to the recruiting managers. The solutions ranged from contacting applicants 
urging them to fill in the correct form (correctly) to hiding identifying 
information in the applications (using whiteout). In some cases they completed 
the application forms manually themselves. Sibbmark (2007) also presents 
further evidence that applicants occasionally contacted the manager by phone, 
managers state that they can identify some of the applicants already at the 
“anonymous” stage, and it is clear that indicators on e.g. ethnicity in some 
cases slipped through to the recruiter.
14  
Whether these examples of non-compliances should be a major concern or 
not depend on the interpretation of the estimates. If one is interested in the 
effects of the policy, they may not be a big problem since non-compliances are 
likely to feature in any real-life application of an AAP. However, if we 
interpret the estimates as quantifying discrimination, then non-compliances 
with the method (most likely) lead to attenuation bias. We have therefore tried 
to address these issues as best we can to see whether they affect our results 
(more on this in the robustness section below). 
                                                      
14 For example, about 11 percent of the “anonymous” forms contained information on place of 
education. 
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We study how AAP affects the interview offer probability and the job offer 
probability. Below we discuss our main strategy in generating these variables. 
In the robustness section we will discuss the sensitivity of our results to some 
aspects of the definitions.  
Interview offers measure whether AAP has an impact on various groups’ 
chances of passing the first stage of the hiring process. Managers were asked to 
code whether the individual was at least offered an interview, using an A on the 
A to D scale described in Section 3.1.1. We code those who either received an 
A or were interviewed as having a positive outcome. The reason for not only 
using the grades is that they are missing for some positions; we are then limited 
to using information on actual interviewees. Obviously, applicants for jobs 
where no grades were given and who declined an interview will be 
misclassified. However, judging on the cases where we do have complete 
information, this is a minor problem.
15 Also, as long as these classification 
errors are not correlated with gender or ethnicity, the problem is handled by the 
inclusion of hiring fixed effects, as described in section 4. 
Our second outcome is the job offer probability, which directly measures 
how AAP affects the final outcome of the hiring procedure. This allows us to 
study whether an impact on the selection of interviewees is offset by selection 
after the interviews. Similar to interview offers, we use explicit data on offers 
rather than acceptances since we do not like to classify applicants turning down 
jobs as unsuccessful. 
3.3  The job openings 
Table 1 presents the job openings included in the data. Note that by a “job 
opening” we actually mean a single ad with a unified hiring process; on some 
occasions the opening actually pertained to several similar jobs. The positions 
have been divided into six broader categories: pre-school staff, teachers, social 
service staff, managers, health service staff and other. The left part of the table 
shows the distribution of the jobs, the right part displays the applicant 
distribution. The latter is more relevant for the empirical analysis, since we 
focus on effects on the chances of an average applicant with given charac-
                                                      
15 87 percent of those who received an A were also interviewed. For grades B, C and D, the 
fractions were 8, 1 and 1 percent respectively. 
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comparison jobs. First, there is only one opening as a manager among the 
comparison jobs, and the fraction of candidates applying to this type of job is 
close to one 10
th of the corresponding fraction on the AAP jobs. There are also 
substantial differences in the categories teachers and health. Due to these 
patterns, we will re-weight the comparison jobs so to conform to the 
distribution of job types among the AAP jobs 
 
Table 1 Description of job openings included in the data 
  # job openings  # applicants (total) 
  Comparison AAP  Total  Comparison AAP  Total 
Type           
Pre-school 10  15  25  306  260  566 
Teachers 10  6  16  408  105  513 
Social service  11  6  17  459  144  603 
Managers 1  11  12  29  174  203 
Health 7  16  23  329  431  760 
Other 8  8  16  590  294  884 
           
Total 47  62  109  2,121  1,408  3,529 
 
It is possible that the AAP will lead to more people being interviewed. Since 
it is harder to separate applicants when some information is hidden, the 
recruiter may invite everybody who fulfils certain criteria. Alternatively, 
managers may wish to circumvent the AAP by interviewing a larger number of 
individuals in order to see their full characteristics. At first glance, Table 2 
gives support to such a hypothesis. The fraction offered an interview is much 
higher for AAP jobs: 38 percent, compared to 17 percent for comparison jobs. 
But further inspection suggests that this is rather a result of a smaller number of 
applicants
16 than of a larger number of interviewees. One possible reason for 
the difference in the number of applicants is that the anonymous procedure is 
more demanding; it does not suffice to send just one’s ordinary CV with a 
slightly modified application letter. Individuals who believe their chances are 
poor, or who are not so interested in the position may then find the cost of 
applying higher than the expected gains. 
                                                      
16 In section 4 we discuss whether differences in the number of applicants may affect the results.  
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Table 2 Number of applicants and interviewed per job opening. 
   Comparison  AAP  Total 
Pre-school  Number of applicants  30.6  17.3  22.6 
  Number invited to interview  6.6  6.1  6.3 
  Fraction invited to interview  0.23  0.46  0.37 
        
Teachers  Number of applicants  40.8  17.5  32.1 
  Number invited to interview  3.3  5.0  3.9 
  Fraction invited to interview  0.09  0.41  0.21 
        
Social service  Number of applicants  41.7  24.0  35.5 
  Number invited to interview  5.0  8.3  6.2 
  Fraction invited to interview  0.13  0.40  0.23 
        
Managers  Number of applicants  29.0  15.8  16.9 
  Number invited to interview  7.0  6.0  6.1 
  Fraction invited to interview  0.24  0.37  0.36 
        
Health  Number of applicants  47.0  26.9  33.0 
  Number invited to interview  8.6  6.9  7.4 
  Fraction invited to interview  0.32  0.36  0.35 
        
Other  Number of applicants  73.8  36.8  55.3 
  Number invited to interview  6.9  7.3  7.1 
  Fraction invited to interview  0.12  0.26  0.19 
        
Total  Number of applicants  45.1  22.7  32.4 
  Number invited to interview*  5.9  6.5  6.2 
  Fraction invited to interview  0.17  0.38  0.29 
Notes: * The difference between AAP and comparison is statistically insignificant. 
 
This illustrates the obvious but important fact that the probability of a 
successful outcome depends strongly on the number of competitors. Also, each 
hiring is unique: the number interviewed ranges from 1 to 19, and the fraction 
interviewed ranges from less than 3 percent to a full 100. As will be described 
below, our model includes a fixed effect for each hiring to account for such 
differences. 
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The first two rows of Table 3 show the two outcomes considered in the 
analysis: being offered an interview and being offered a job respectively. As 
discussed above, the probability of success is lower in the comparison location, 
which is a result of the larger number of applicants. 
About one in five applicants are men. 81 percent of the applicants to AAP 
jobs are of Swedish origin; for comparison jobs the figure is 74 percent. 
Among non-Swedish applicants, the non-Western category is by far the largest, 
encompassing 16 percent of the total sample. The average applicant is about 35 
years old. The level of education is high: three out of four has at least two years 
of tertiary education. 64 percent of the applicants possess the requested type of 
education. 42 percent have experience from working in the kind of position 
they applied for; with the average amount of experience being 1.7 years (i.e. 4 
years conditional on having any experience). As seen in the table, we also 
include dummies for experience given through work on hourly basis (which is 
typically hard to convert into work years from a CV) and internships. 
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Interview offer  .29  .13  .19 
Job offer  .07  .03  .05 
Female .81  .76  .78 
Gender unknown  .03  .06  .05 
Region of origin (Sweden ref)       
Western .02  .03  .03 
Non-Western .12  .19  .16 
Unknown .05  .04  .05 
X-variables      






Level of education: At most secondary (high school)*  .20  .18  .19 
Tertiary, <2 years  .03  .03  .03 
Tertiary ≥ 2 years  .72 .73  .73 
Graduate .01  .01  .01 
Missing .03  .05  .04 
Requested education: yes  .69  .60  .64 
Requested edu: overqualified .00  .01  .01 






Has experience in position in question  .48  .38  .42 
Has exp. on hourly basis .10  .07  .08 
Has exp. from internship  .14  .20  .18 






Has other exp.  .32  .17  .23 
Has other exp. on hourly basis  .04  .03  .03 
Has other exp. from internship  .02  .03  .03 
Photograph included  .04  .09  .07 
Poor language  .03  .04  .04 
Employed by Gothenburg city  .11  .03  .06 
Priority .01  .00  .01 
# observations  1,408  2,121  3,529 
Notes: Standard deviations of continuous variables are in parentheses.  Variables are as indicated 
by CV and letter. *Only 10 applicants have less than secondary education. 
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The main purpose of the analysis is to investigate whether AAP changes the 
influence of two individual characteristics in the hiring process: gender and 
ethnicity (as captured by region of origin).
17 A natural starting point is 
therefore to compare men and women, and applicants of different origin, who 
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where y is either an interview offer or a job offer, i indexes the individual and j 
the job opening. All our estimations include hiring fixed effects,  j α . Thus, the 
analysis acknowledges that the probability of success is unique to each job 
opening, and may be so for any number of unobserved reasons. If AAP works 
as intended, we should see no effect of gender or ethnicity once controlling for 
all X-variables observed by the employer in the “anonymous” stage. 
However, to see if the policy had any impact, we need to establish a 
counterfactual, i.e. what would the role of gender and ethnicity had been if 
normal application procedures had been used? To this end we use the 
comparison jobs. We start by estimating equation (1) for these jobs to show 
how the characteristics affect the outcomes under normal circumstances. We 
then proceed to estimating a model where we can formally test whether AAP 
had an impact on these estimates. Here we include all jobs, AAP or not, and 
estimate how AAP changes the role of gender and ethnicity. In practice, we 
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17 One could of course consider also discrimination/selection along other dimensions e.g. age. 
Estimates in Table A1 show that age discrimination is not an issue in our setting. 
IFAU – Do anonymous job application procedures level the playing field?  18The model examines whether immigrants (women) fare better relative to 
natives (men) when applications are anonymous than they do under “normal” 
circumstances. The model can thus be viewed as a Differences-in Differences 
(DD) model.
18  
Even though it is (supposedly) impossible for recruiting officers to identify 
gender and ethnicity, applicants from different groups may differ system-
atically in their disclosed credentials, and therefore in their hiring probabilities. 
It is thus important that the empirical model accounts for such differences in 
credentials. We therefore include a vector X in the models, which controls for 
the information that can be found in the application forms or the full 
application depending on specification. The explanatory variables included in X 
are the ones presented in Table 3, with the modification that age is included as 
dummies for five-year intervals (see also Table A1). Since it is possible that 
AAP changes the role of the covariates we allow the impact of the covariates to 
vary between the AAP jobs and comparison jobs. 
The parameters  and  respectively capture the difference in the prob-
ability of success in the comparison locations between men and women, and 
between different region-of-origin groups. The parameters of primary interest 
are  and   which measure how the influence of gender and origin differs 
between the AAP jobs and the comparison jobs. The idea is that such 





The identifying assumption for consistency of the point estimates is that 
there are no systematic differences (unrelated to the "experiment") in the hiring 
probabilities of men (natives) relative to women (immigrants) between the 
AAP and comparison jobs. Such problems can arise if there are differences in 
the pools of applicants across the regimes. We have investigated three possible 
problems: (i) that the impact of gender and/or ethnicity varies with the number 
of applicants (possibly as a result of recruiters turning to less informed sorting 
strategies); (ii) that it varies with the fraction of applicants belonging to 
different groups; (iii) that there are quality differences of the applicants in 
different groups in the two regimes. To address (i) and (ii) we ran regressions 
(including hiring fixed effects) for the comparison jobs only and included 
interaction terms between the group dummies and the number of applicants and 
                                                      
18 Since job fixed effects are included in the models there is no need for a specific dummy 
variable for the AAP jobs. 
IFAU – Do anonymous job application procedures level the playing field?   19 the fraction females/foreign origin among the applicants. The results indicated 
that females fare just slightly worse the larger the number of applicants but are 
unaffected by the gender composition. Those with foreign background actually 
gain when there are more applicants and a larger fraction of non-Swedish 
origin. Thus, this phenomenon is unlikely to explain the gender results of the 
main analysis, and (if anything) give a downward bias in the estimated origin 
impact of AAP (given that there are fewer applicants and smaller fractions of 
foreign origin in the AAP jobs). 
In order to investigate (iii) we ran regressions for the comparison jobs 
(leaving out group dummies in the dimension of interest but including all other 
covariates), and then compared the predicted values across regimes and 
gender/origin. There is no indication of differential selection on gender 
between AAP and comparison jobs, but a (non-significant) negative differential 
in the origin dimension, suggesting that ethnic minorities with lower 
credentials may have applied for the AAP jobs. Thus, if anything we would 
expect a negative bias in the main results regarding origin, assuming that 
selection on unobserved characteristics is correlated with observed charac-
teristics. 
But even when the identifying assumption is fulfilled, inference is 
complicated if the error terms are not independent. Specifically, we worry that 
different managers may have different preferences for hiring different groups. 
It cannot, for example, be ruled out that a certain manager treats all appli-
cations from Swedish males in a favorable way, whereas other managers do 
not.  Then, we have a systematic correlation in the error terms within job-
gender-origin clusters. We therefore correct our standard errors to allow for 
(arbitrary) correlations within such clusters. 
5 Results 
This section first presents the results from the baseline empirical analysis and 
then turns to discuss some robustness checks. We begin with how anonymity 
affects the probability of being offered an interview and then look at the final 
outcome of the hiring process, i.e. who is offered the job. 
IFAU – Do anonymous job application procedures level the playing field?  205.1 Interview  offers 
Table 4 presents the estimates on interview offers. We start by estimating 
equation (1), where we only include AAP jobs, and look at whether gender or 
origin matter for the hiring probabilities when AAP is used. The specification 
controls for the covariates which can be observed in the interview selection 
stage of the AAP hiring process. The estimates show no significant effect of 
either gender or origin, and we can thus not reject that AAP works as intended.  
The question then is whether gender or ethnicity would have mattered for 
the interview probability if AAP had not been used. To study this, column (ii) 
shows the corresponding estimates for the comparison jobs. In this case we 
control for the X-variables as observed in the CV and/or application letter. 
Here we see clear negative estimates from non-Western immigrants and 
positive estimates for males, just as we would expect from previous studies. 
Remember that about 20 percent of the applicants were offered an interview, 
which means that the point estimate of –0.09 for those of non-Western origin 
suggests close to 50 percent lower chances of being offered an interview. The 
order of magnitude is similar to what Carlsson & Rooth (2007) find in their 
correspondence testing, and is thus not an implausible baseline for a typical 
hiring. Immigrants from western countries do not appear to be significantly 
disfavored in the hiring process, something which is also broadly in line with 
previous research on ethnicity in the Swedish labor market (Lange 1999).  
To formally test whether AAP had an impact we estimate equation (2) 
which is essentially a Differences-in-Differences (DD) model since we 
estimate whether the effects of gender and ethnicity are different when AAP is 
used than when it is not used. In Table 4, we see the estimates of the interaction 
parameter ( ) between the origin dummies and the AAP indicator in columns 
(iii) and (iv). Column (iii) uses “anonymous” X-variables for the AAP jobs and 
(iv) uses CV/letter information for both types of jobs. It is reassuring that the 
source of the covariates does not affect the estimates of main interest. For non-
Western immigrants the AAP effects are positive and significant, suggesting 
that anonymous applications do increase the chances for individuals of non-
Western origin by approximately 8 percentage points. The difference for the 
male dummy between AAP and comparison jobs is also statistically and 
economically significant: the estimate of  suggests that anonymity increases 




IFAU – Do anonymous job application procedures level the playing field?   21 It is also of interest to see how AAP affects the importance of other 
covariates. These estimates, presented in Table A1 in the appendix, are based 
on covariates as observed in the CV and/or application letter.
19 In general, the 
coefficients show an expected pattern which supports the variable definitions 
chosen. Level of education is more or less irrelevant, but having the requested 
education matters a great deal. Both experience measures (“requested” and 
“other relevant”) matter, in the qualitative (yes/no) as well as the quantitative 
sense (years). The inclusion of the “poor language” indicator decreases the risk 
that the region-of-origin dummies actually capture selection on skills; the 
estimate also shows that language matters. As expected, having some sort of 
connection or priority greatly increases the chances of passing the first hurdle 
of the hiring process. The interaction estimates suggest (apart from gender and 
origin) that the AAP significantly increases the importance of: “requested 
education” and “less than 2 years tertiary education”. This can be interpreted as 
saying that formal qualifications become more important when gender and 
origin as well as all “soft” indicators provided through application letters are 
concealed. 
We interpret these results as strongly suggesting that an anonymous 
application procedure affects the chances for disadvantaged groups to be 
offered interviews on jobs they apply for. The patterns found in the comparison 
group are much in line with previous research suggesting that the processes 
generating interview offers is roughly similar to that of other jobs in the 
Swedish economy (as long as a “normal” procedure is used): conditional on a 
vast number of observed characteristics, women and ethnic minorities 
experience lower chances of advancing to the interview stage of the hiring 
process. Under the AAP regime these differences are no longer significant. 
Furthermore, the difference between the two regimes is significant, suggesting 
that an anonymous application procedure is a working tool to promote 
disadvantaged groups’ probabilities of being offered job interviews.  
                                                      
19 Estimates from the other models are available upon request. 
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Female .028 –.060** –.060**  –.060** 
 (.026) (.022) (.022)  (.022) 
AAP for females  .088*  .083* 
 (.034)  (.035) 
Non–Western origin  –.004 –.089** –.089**  –.089** 
 (.033) (.025) (.025)  (.025) 
AAP for non–Western  .084*  .082* 
 (.041)  (.041) 
Western origin  .003 –.034 –.034  –.034 
 (.060) (.057) (.057)  (.057) 
AAP for Western  .037  .036 
 (.082)  (.089) 
Observations 1,408 2,121 3,529  3,529 
R–squared .34 .23 .30  .29 
X:s from AAP-form  Yes No AAP  No 
X:s from CV and letter  No Yes Comparison  Yes 
Covariates interacted with AAP  -- -- Yes  Yes 
Hiring fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Estimates from linear probability models, robust (clustered on job-gender-origin) standard 
errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the individual was offered an 
interview. The sets of control variables are presented in Table 3.  AAP is an indicator that the 
hiring was made using the AAP procedure. Sweden (male) is the reference category for region of 
origin (gender). * (**) indicates significance at the 5(1)-percent level. 
 
5.2 Job  offers 
We have so far established that AAP matters for the selection to interviews. 
The natural next step is to ask whether it affects who receives a job offer. From 
a methodological perspective, however, this poses a challenge since the 
absolute number of positive outcomes is small, especially when we are 
studying subgroups. The data contain 167 observations where a job offer was 
given, so there is bound to be substantial statistical uncertainty in the analysis. 
Having said this, Table 5 presents estimates corresponding to those 
discussed above, but with the dependent variable being an indicator of whether 
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rience a disadvantage in the probability of being offered a position using 
normal procedures, and there is nothing to suggest that AAP changes this. A 
negative estimate, which is actually larger than that for the “non-Western” 
group, is also found for the “Western” group but with a very low statistical 
precision. 
Unfortunately, statistical uncertainty hinders firm conclusions on a possible 
backlash for the non-Western group at the interview stage. Although the 
positive impact of AAP on interview offers does not survive into job offers, we 
are unable to pin down a statistically significant effect on the job offer rate 
conditional on being invited to an interview (column v). Note also that the 
policy affects the first stage and that this will generate a sample selection 
problem in this specification: The distributions of unobserved factors among 
those chosen to the interviews are likely to differ systematically between the 
AAP jobs and the comparison jobs.
20 Therefore one should be extra careful in 
interpreting the estimates where the sampling is conditional on being inter-
viewed.  
For gender, we find a large coefficient in favor of men applying for com-
parison jobs, but this is almost turned around with the anonymous procedure. 
The tendency towards a more favorable treatment of women under AAP is in a 
relative sense much stronger here than in the interview selection stage since the 
average probability of a job offer is so much smaller. This is also evident in the 
last column of Table 5, which studies the job offer rates among those actually 
invited to interviews. The point estimates show that women succeed much 
more frequently in the interview stage if it is an AAP hiring. Note though that 
the estimates in the last column should be viewed with caution for the reasons 
listed above. 
                                                      
20 For example, it is likely that those immigrants actually selected to interviews in the 
comparison jobs have better unobserved factors (on average) since managers appear more 
reluctant towards selecting immigrants under such procedures.  
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Female .029* –.038* –.038* –.038* –.157** 
 (.014) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.058) 
AAP for females  .067** .065** .241** 
 (.021) (.021) (.085) 
Non–Western origin  –.024 –.021** –.021** –.021** –.132 
 (.018) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.085) 
AAP for non–Western  –.003 –.004 –.021 
 (.020) (.020) (.107) 
Western origin  –.003 –.039* –.039* –.039* –.095 
 (.040) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.093) 
AAP for Western  .036 .030 .136 
 (.043) (.042) (.210) 
Observations 1,408 2,121 3,529 3,529 684 
R–squared .14 .08 .12 .12 .28 
X:s from AAP-form  Yes No AAP No No 
X:s from CV and letter  No Yes Comparison Yes Yes 
Covariates interacted with AAP   -- -- Yes Yes Yes 
Hiring fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Conditional on interview offer  No No No No Yes 
Notes: Estimates from linear probability models, robust (clustered on job-gender-origin) standard 
errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the individual was offered an 
interview. The sets of control variables are presented in Table 3.  AAP is an indicator that the 
hiring was made using the AAP procedure. . Sweden (male) is the reference category for region 
of origin (gender). * (**) indicates significance at the 5(1)-percent level. 
 
5.3  Robustness checks and variations 
This section discusses some robustness checks and variations on the baseline 
specifications. We begin with the definitions of outcome variables and key 
explanatory variables. Then we consider modeling aspects and restrictions on 
the sample. Finally, we discuss potential heterogeneous effects of the reform. 
Some of the results are presented in Tables A2–A4 in the appendix and other 
results are available on request. 
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The outcome variables used above are quite natural; they respectively capture 
success in the first stage and the full hiring process. Still, the grading of the 
applicants give scope to alternative definitions, especially if one is interested in 
how the recruiter reacts to the applications present. It turns out that if we 
instead use only the “A”, or “A or B” (thus including also those considered 
interesting but not to be interviewed in the first stage) grade, we get basically 
the same results as in the baseline case. Similarly, using an indicator for being 
hired instead of offered the job gives results that do not differ much from the 
ones presented above. 
There are several signals that potentially may cause discrimination. Even 
though somebody does not explicitly say anything about a foreign background, 
names often reveal this information. As an alternative we therefore used a 
grouping of names that roughly corresponded to the regions of origin used in 
the baseline analysis. The results were qualitatively the same, but in general it 
seems that names have a smaller impact than does actual origin. We also tested 
using explicit immigrant status
21 instead of region of origin, an exercise which 
confirmed the baseline results. 
5.3.2 Specification  issues  and sample restrictions 
The baseline specification allows the X-variables to have a differential effect 
depending on whether the job is AAP or a comparison job. We believe that this 
is sensible given that the selection process may differ between the two regimes. 
However, the main results are not dependent on the interaction or sensitive to 
using a more restricted set of covariates (results available upon request).  
The models presented above re-weight the sample of comparison jobs so as 
to match the occupational structure of the AAP jobs. Using unweighted data 
gives a smaller origin effect in the comparison jobs, even though the qualitative 
pattern remains. At face value, this suggests more selection on origin in the 
type of jobs included in the AAP. Since managers had negative views towards 
AAP, one could fear an opposite pattern (i.e. that they withheld hirings where 
they wished to select on origin), and it is not unlikely that the difference in job 
types is due to random variation in job openings.  
                                                      
21 For immigrant status to be one, the application must contain some explicit information on this, 
e.g. “I was born in…” or “I came to Sweden in year…”. 
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problematic given that the probability varies so much across job openings. 
Such fears are unwarranted since using a probit confirms the baseline 
estimates. 
Since the econometric model includes dummies for each job opening, we 
remove any particularities common to all applications to a specific job. The 
model thus handles, e.g., the possibility that many immigrants happened to 
apply for a vacancy that was already from the beginning to be filled by 
someone known by the manager, so that only this person was interviewed. We 
have nevertheless tried excluding all jobs where the forms indicate any form of 
inconsistency. This did not affect the basic results either. A related problem is 
how to deal with observations where there are indications that identifying 
information “leaked”; dropping these observations also gave results consistent 
with the ones presented above.  
Another issue is how to treat observations that have incomplete information 
or are hard to classify for other reasons. Some applications lack region of origin 
or gender; in the results presented above, these observations are included as 
separate categories (but not discussed). Dropping these observations does 
however not change the results. The problem of identifying gender deserves 
special attention since it is strongly correlated with region of origin (as long as 
there are names somewhere in the application). One could thus worry that the 
policy impact on the importance of origin is biased by the inclusion of the 
interaction of “missing gender” and the location dummy. We therefore 
estimated a model without the AAP-female interaction, and found that the 
estimates on region of origin were largely unaltered. 
In the early stages of the pilot, the districts had discretion over how to 
implement the AAP, and which jobs to include. From November 2005 the 
implementation was harmonized across districts, and the policy was to include 
all jobs in the districts. In other words, there was less scope for selection 
effects. Using only hirings performed after this date confirms the baseline 
results. 
5.3.3 Heterogeneity 
It is possible that the impact of AAP varies within the categories used in the 
baseline analysis. For example, the origin coefficient could vary across gender 
or across countries within the non-Western group. We have therefore estimated 
models on different subsamples. However, sample size problems prevent 
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interpretation of other estimates due to statistical uncertainty even when we 
focus on interview offers. 
Our region-of-origin groups are large, and there may be differences in the 
country of origin composition across the treatment and comparison groups, 
which pose a problem if the origin effect varies within the broader groups. To 
check this possibility and still have reasonable sample size, we tried using a 
special category for people from Iran and Iraq, two of the major non-Western 
groups of applicants. We found (results available upon request) that the effect 
of AAP in this group is similar to that in the remaining non-Western category, 
suggesting that this heterogeneity should not be a major concern. 
A related issue is if there are differential effects in other dimensions, most 
notably the interaction between gender and ethnicity. Unfortunately there are 
too few immigrant males in the data to estimate interacted models with any 
precision. Attempts along these lines suggest that the gender impact is present 
in all groups, but that the impact on region of origin is driven by women. 
The importance of anonymity may also differ depending on the applicants’ 
credentials; e.g., whether you have a Swedish or a foreign education. Our 
estimations suggest that those with Swedish degrees benefit more from 
anonymity than those with foreign degrees. One interpretation is that the 
information on education in some cases is used as a signal on a foreign 
background, even though there is no direct information on place of education.  
It is also possible that anonymity will have greater impact on some types of 
jobs than others. Our analysis (results available upon request) suggests that the 
gender impact is relatively uniform across occupation types. The origin effects 
appear to be strong for teachers (including pre-school). Unfortunately we have 
too few observations to study managerial positions separately.
22
We have also investigated whether the effects of AAP differ across the two 
participating districts (results available upon request). As it turns out, the 
gender effects are very similar, but the policy impact on the influence of region 
of origin is somewhat stronger in the more immigrant dense district of 
Kortedala than in Centrum. This is reassuring, given that the resident 
population in Kortedala is more similar to Gunnared than is Centrum. So 
                                                      
22 This would have been particularly interesting given that Eriksson & Lagerström (2007) find 
that a foreign name is a particular disadvantage for highly qualified positions.  
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appear to be driving the results.  
Another interesting variation is whether the AAP impact depends on the 
characteristics of the manager. Unfortunately, there are too few foreign-origin 
managers, and sample size is a problem also in the gender dimension (due to a 
small number of male managers). If one is nevertheless willing to interpret 
these estimates, they suggest that female managers drive the gender effect of 
AAP. It is also among female managers we find negative first stage treatment 
of people of non-Western origin in the comparison jobs, which is eliminated 
under AAP. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
This paper investigates how anonymous job application procedures (AAP) 
affect discrimination in the hiring process. The policy pilot we analyze was 
implemented in the Swedish city of Gothenburg. The data include some 3,500 
applications to more than 100 jobs. The results are quite striking: women and 
ethnic minorities, who are disadvantaged elsewhere in the economy, do not 
experience a penalty in the interview selection stage when applying to jobs 
using AAP. They thus receive substantially higher probabilities of being 
interviewed under AAP than in comparison jobs where normal hiring 
procedures were employed. These patterns are in line with expectations if AAP 
works as intended. In fact, one could argue that the comparison jobs are 
unnecessary. The absence of gender and ethnic differences in the jobs where 
anonymous application procedures are used is in itself a strong indicator of a 
policy impact, given previous research. 
When studying job offers, the results are less clear. Immigrants do not 
appear to benefit in terms of job offers when AAP is used, but women do. 
Ultimately, the AAP policy appears to be effective in terms of affecting job 
opportunities mainly in the gender dimension and not so much so in the ethnic 
dimension. For women, our results concur with the findings of Goldin & Rouse 
(2000) for symphonic orchestras, but for a wider and more common set of 
occupations. 
Given these results, is AAP a policy to be recommended? At first glance, 
the case for anonymous applications may seem strong: each applicant should 
be treated based on his/her credentials only. But the policy also comes at a cost 
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Place of education and place of work experience must be hidden for ethnic 
anonymity, at least where ethnicity is correlated with being foreign-born. In 
addition, one must consider the fact that this policy may actually create an 
obstacle to some individuals supposed to benefit from the policy. An immigrant 
with a degree from a prestigious university combined with an international 
career will probably look worse to many employers when this information is 
concealed. Employers wishing to increase the representation of under-
represented/disadvantaged groups may also consider anonymity an obstacle. 
Another practical concern is how the method is received by those involved; as 
Sibbmark (2007) shows, managers and administrators in Gothenburg were very 
displeased with the method, much due to the increased administrative burden. 
These problems and drawbacks must then be weighed against the gains 
from using the method. The experiences from Gothenburg suggest that it is 
indeed possible to affect at least the first stage of the hiring process. One might 
argue that the effort is in vain since the most disadvantaged group did not 
experience any real improvement. On the other hand, equality of opportunity in 
advancing to the second stage may have a value in itself, or at least constitute a 
first step toward a fair hiring process. In the end, whether anonymous appli-
cations are to be considered a suitable means against discrimination depends on 
how different pros and cons are valued. Our results suggest, however, that it 
does affect the hiring practices of recruiting managers in the intended direction. 
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Table A1 Full set of estimates for specification (iv) of Table 4 and Table 5. 
  Interview offer  Job offer 
 Comparison 
Difference 
AAP-Comp  Comparison 
Difference 
AAP-Comp 
Western –.034  .036  –.039*  .030 
 (.057)  (.089)  (.018)  (.042) 
Non-Western –.089**  .082*  –.021**  –.004 
 (.025)  (.041)  (.008)  (.020) 
Unknown origin  –.003  .143  .060  .028 
 (.070)  (.099)  (.046)  (.068) 
Female .060**  –.083*  .038*  –.065** 
 (.022)  (.035)  (.015)  (.021) 
Gender unknown  –.030  –.027  .010  –.020 
 (.037)  (.078)  (.015)  (.043) 
Tertiary, <2 years  –.008  .150*  –.002  –.012 
 (.035)  (.066)  (.012)  (.038) 
Tertiary ≥ 2 years  .096+  .018  .040**  –.041+ 
 (.051)  (.062)  (.014)  (.025) 
Graduate –.079  .107  .017  .061 
 (.092)  (.125)  (.022)  (.120) 
Missing education  .115** –.004  .025 –.013 
 (.042)  (.076)  (.020)  (.043) 
Requested education: yes .088**  .116**  .027*  .009 
 (.026)  (.040)  (.011)  (.020) 
Requested edu: overqualified –.041  .023  –.031+  –.093 
 (.073)  (.112)  (.016)  (.072) 
Born 1950–54 (–1949 ref.)  –.093  .202  .007  .048 
 (.128)  (.140)  (.013)  (.039) 
1955–59 –.018  .161  .052*  .024 
 (.124)  (.139)  (.024)  (.043) 
1960–64 .060  .139  .047*  .040 
 (.094)  (.110)  (.020)  (.038) 
1965–69 .066  .148  .075  .004 
 (.083)  (.104)  (.050)  (.059) 
1970–74 .078  .122  .069**  .028 
 (.070)  (.091)  (.019)  (.039) 
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 Comparison 
Difference 
AAP-Comp  Comparison 
Difference 
AAP-Comp 
1975–79 .072  .139  .061**  .012 
 (.088)  (.107)  (.018)  (.037) 
1980–84 .021  .136  .044*  .067+ 
 (.087)  (.103)  (.021)  (.040) 
1985– .002  .183  .041*  .009 
 (.102)  (.135)  (.021)  (.043) 
Birth year missing  .076  .006  .038+  .004 
 (.063)  (.088)  (.021)  (.037) 
Photograph included  –.022  –.025  –.006  –.038 
 (.028)  (.055)  (.012)  (.027) 
Experience in position (years) .012+  .006  .001  .003 
 (.007)  (.007)  (.002)  (.003) 
Has exp. on hourly basis .037  –.002  –.006  –.022 
 (.037)  (.054)  (.013)  (.029) 
Has exp. from internship  .053*  –.026  .037*  –.028 
 (.025)  (.053)  (.015)  (.028) 
Has experience in position .117**  –.029  .020  .015 
 (.041)  (.051)  (.014)  (.022) 
Other relevant exp. (hours) .006*  .005  .002  –.002 
 (.003)  (.004)  (.001)  (.002) 
Other exp. from internship  –.004  .106  –.019  .013 
 (.058)  (.095)  (.026)  (.042) 
Other exp. on hourly basis  –.005  .101  –.002  –.070* 
 (.038)  (.079)  (.016)  (.029) 
Has other relevant experience .018  –.056  –.005  –.002 
 (.039)  (.050)  (.015)  (.024) 
Poor language  –.072*  –.002  –.018*  –.027 
 (.029)  (.053)  (.008)  (.020) 
Employed by Gothenburg city  .159*  .091  .072  –.003 
 (.068)  (.079)  (.056)  (.062) 
Priority .542*  –.319  –.019  .214 
 (.224)  (.259)  (.051)  (.142) 
Note: Qualifications are as they appear in the full application including CV and application letter; 
i.e. specification (iv) of Tables 4 and 5 
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  Interview offers                   Job offers 
  Graded A  Graded A or B  Hired 
Female  –.051* –.060* –.038* 
  (.021) (.024) (.015) 
AAP for females  .054+  .076*  .076** 
  (.031) (.035) (.019) 
Non–Western  origin  –.084** –.133** –.019** 
  (.026) (.043) (.007) 
AAP for non–Western  .074+  .103+  –.011 
  (.039) (.054) (.018) 
Observations  3529 3529 3529 
R-squared  .26 .38 .10 
Notes: Graded A (or B) means that applicant is coded as having a positive outcome if graded 
with A (or B), see Section 3 for details. The baseline specification in the main text includes 
those either graded with A or interviewed as positive outcomes. Hired means that the 
applicant was eventually hired, the baseline specification in the main text was based on 
offers. + (*) {**} indicates significance at the 10(5){1}-percent level. 






















Female –.043+  –.058* –.058** –.056** –.083** 
  (.023) (.026) (.022) (.018) (.028) 
AAP for females  .073* .104** .121**  .080* .110** 
  (.036) (.036) (.041) (.032) (.038) 
Non–Western  origin  –.101** –.075** –.084** –.046** –.088** 
  (.031) (.021) (.024) (.016) (.021) 
AAP for non–
Western .129**  .076+ .105*  .040 .133+ 
  (.049) (.040) (.048) (.036) (.070) 
Observations  3046 3149 3037 3529 3506 




Female –.039*  –.019+ –.035* –.022*  –.023** 
  (.017) (.011) (.015) (.010) (.007) 
AAP for females  .059** .065** .094** .050** .040** 
  (.023) (.018) (.025) (.017) (.013) 
Non–Western origin  –.029**  –.023**  –.021*  –.008  –.009** 
  (.009) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.002) 
AAP for non–
Western  .007 –.001 –.011 –.017  .004 
  (.024) (.022) (.025) (.020) (.009) 
Observations  3046 3149 3037 3529 3179 
R-squared  .13 .13 .13 .11   
Notes: Restrictions are described in the main text. Table entries for the probit model are the 
estimated effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 in the variable of interest. + (*) {**} indicates 
significance at the 10(5){1}-percent level. 
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Table A4 Heterogeneous effects 
  By gender  By origin  By place of education 
 Males  Females  Sweden 
Non-




Female  --  -- –.050* –.063* –.056* –.053* 
     (.024) (.027) (.025) (.022) 
AAP for females   --  --  .076* .115+ .092* .065+ 
     (.037) (.066) (.037) (.035) 
Non–Western  origin  –.055 –.104**  --  --  –.069* –.107** 
  (.038) (.028)     (.033) (.031) 
AAP for non–Western   –.058  .128*  --  --  .129*  .038 
  (.067) (.050)     (.053) (.059) 
Observations  770 2,596 2,699  634 3,215 3,013 
R-squared  .43 .33 .31 .54 .30 .30 
        
  Job offers 
Female --  --  –.040*  –.030+ –.039* –.037* 
     (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
AAP for females  --  --  .068**  .023  .074**  .060** 
     (.022) (.039) (.022) (.021) 
Non–Western  origin  –.025 –.026**  --  --  –.012 –.036** 
  (.017) (.007)     (.010) (.010) 
AAP for non–Western   –.035  .012  --  --  .030  –.045+ 
  (.047) (.021)     (.033) (.023) 
Observations  770 2,596 2,699  634 3,215 3,013 
R-squared  .32 .14 .14 .41 .13 .12 
Notes: Place of education excludes/includes people of non-Swedish origin depending on where 
education is taken. Those of Swedish origin are included regardless of place of education. + (*) 
{**} indicates significance at the 10(5){1}-percent level. 
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